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ASPECTS OF FEDERAL RENT CONTROL
JOHN F. MCCARTHY
Generally, the necessity for some type of residential rent control is con-
ceded. Likewise, the desirability of continued control for some time after
the war, at least until new construction has effected a near normal renting
market, is accepted.' With real estate the basis for much of our wealth,
federal control of residential rents is a restriction of primary importance.
At the same time, many lawyers, confronted by the numerous wartime laws
and regulations, often have not had the opportunity to become familiar with
rent control. This article seeks to give certain general information about
the program and to discuss some problems which, in the writer's experience,
sometimes have been puzzling. More specifically, after a general review of
the applicable statute and reulations, this article will discuss the constitu-
tional bases for federal control of residential rents; compliance with the
applicable statutory requirement concerning general fairness and equity of
regulations; review of regulations and orders issued thereunder, including
satisfaction of the requirements for due process in such proceedings.
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE-THE EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT OF 1942,
As AMENDED
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as variously amended, 2
established the Office of Price Administration and provides for an Adminis-
trator thereof. Sections 2 (b) and 2 (d) of the Act direct the designation
of so-called defense rental areas, viz., areas where defense activities have re-
sulted or threaten to result in increases in rents for housing accommodations
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, and the issuance of regulations or
orders concerning such accommodations within those areas establishing
maximum rents, restricting evictions of tenants, and regulating or prohibit-
ing speculative or manipulative renting or leasing practices. The sections
contain'various standards to guide the Administrator in issuing regulations
or orders.3 Among other things, he is directed, so far as practicable, to
iOn June 30, 1945, the President approved Senate Joint Resolution 30, adopted by the
Congress, which, among other things, extended the authority of the Administrator of the
Office of Price Administration and of all regulations for the control of residential rents
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, for one year, or through
June 30, 1946.
256 Stat. 23, 767; 58 Stat. 632; Senate Joint Resolution 30, approved June 30, 1945;
U.S.C.A., Title 50, App., § 901 et seq.3in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641 (1944), the United States
68
FEDERAL RENT CONTROL
ascertain and give due consideration to rents on a date, not earlier than April
1, 1940, which do not reflect increases inconsistent with the purposes of
the Act, and to make adjustments for relevant factors of general applica-
bility, including property taxes and other costs. The regulations must be
generally fair and equitable. Thus it will be seen that federal control of
residential rents is not geographically universal, but is restricted to defense
rental areas. However, at the present time, most populous areas have been
subjected to control.4
The Act also establishes elaborate procedures for review of regulations
and orders, which will be discussed in further detail later, and provides
several sanctions to enforce compliance, a matter not within the scope of this
article.i
THE REGULATIONS
Pursuant to the authority of The Emergency Price Control Act, as
amended, the Administrator has issued two regulations,6 effective within the
various defense rental areas, 7 one covering housing generally and the other
rooms within rooming houses and hotels. Under those regulations, all types
of housing accommodations within the defense rental areas, not only houses
and apartments and rooms within rooming houses and hotels, but also
trailers, tourist camps, and, in fact, any type of accommodation rented for
living purposes, have been subjected to control.
The regulations for housing generally and for rooms within rooming
houses and hotels are similar in purpose and effect, although to some extent
containing different provisions by reason of differences in types of accom-
modations covered. Each has four principal parts, viz., one freezing rents,
a second freezing the equipment and services furnished with accommodations,
Supreme Court decided that in view of those standards the act was not invalid as an
attempted delegation of legislative power to the Administrator.4At the present time, federal control of residential rents is in effect in approximately
400 separate defense rental areas, containing 15,000,000 housing units and 80,000,000
people.5There are three principal sanctions, viz., an injunction to restrain violations provided
for by § 205 (a) of the Act; a criminal penalty of a fine of not more than $5,000 or im-prisonment for not more than a year, or both, on conviction of wilfull violations, provided
for by § 205 (b) of the Act; and triple damages, three times overcharges of rent, at the
suit of the tenant or the administrator, provided for by § 205 (c) of the Act.GFor the housing regulation, see 9 FED. REG. 11335; for the hotel and rooming house
regulation, 9 FED. REG. 11322.7For the areas in and around New York City, Atlantic City and Miami, separate
regulations have been issued, which, while basically the same as the regulations forhousing and for hotels and rooming houses effective elsewhere, contain some different
provisions necessary by reason of peculiarities in these areas.
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a third restricting the eviction of tenants, and a fourth requiring registration
of all units. Essentially, the regulations are a freeze and not an equalization
program. Nowhere do they provide for increases in rents solely because the
rent of a particular unit is lower than that of similar units in the same build-
ing or in the same neighborhood.
Very generally speaking, the regulations, in Section 4 thereof, provide
that maximum rents for a house or an apartment shall be the rent thereof
on a certain freeze date, and for a room within a rooming house or hotel,
the highest rate for each term (daily, weekly, or monthly) and for each
number of occupants (one, two, or three) during a thirty day period ending
on the same freeze date. The freeze date varies from area to area.s Section 5
provides for adjustments in frozen rents-increases on petitions of land-
lords, decreases on applications of tenants or on the initiative of the Ad-
ministrator. The most common grounds for adjustments of rents are major
capital improvements, as distinguished from ordinary repairs, replacement
and maintenance; substantial deterioration, as distinguished from ordinary
wear and tear; substantial increases or substantial decreases in furniture,
furnishings, equipment or services; some blood, personal or special relation-
ship between the landlord and the tenant resulting in a rent substantially
lower or higher than rents of comparable units; substantial hardship by
reason of a substantial decrease in net income for the current year as com-
pared with a period prior to the freeze date due to a substantial and un-
avoidable increase in property taxes or operating costs.
Still very generally speaking, the regulations, in Sections 3 and 5 (b)
thereof, require that the landlord must continue to supply substantially the
furniture, furnishings, equipment and services furnished on the freeze date.
Again, adjustments are permitted, usually after petitions or reports by land-
lords and with reductions in rents following substantial decreases in equip-
ment or services. Here emphasis must be placed on the word substantial.
It permits of some minor decreases in equipment or services without corres-
ponding reductions in rents.9
Section 6 restricts evictions of tenants. With certain exceptions, regard-
less of the termination of a lease or other rental agreement, a landlord may
not evict a tenant. The most common exceptions are for nonpayment of rent,
8Thus the freeze date in the Chicago area is March 1, 1942; in Detroit, April 1, 1941;
in Cleveland, July 1, 1941.
gThus in houses or apartments, somewhat less cleaning or decorating may be furnished
and in hotels, doormen and Sunday maid service, except to transient guests, may be
discontinued, all without rent reductions.
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continued violation of a substantial obligation of tenancy after written notice
that such violation cease, commission of a nuisance, self-occupancy by the
landlord and under express permission to evict under local law granted after
petition by the landlord.
Section 7 requires the registration of all units with local rent offices, and,
in rooming houses and hotels, the'posting of rates in each room and the main-
tenance of certain records.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The United States Supreme Court has decided that the war powers con-
ferred on the Congress by the Constitution amply sustain the right to con-
trol residential rents as expressed by The Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, as amended.10 The Court might have reached the same result on the
basis of the monetary powers of the Constitution." The validity of continued
federal control of residential rents, even for some period after the termina-
tion of the war, can be sustained by reference to the same powers.12
The present day application of the war powers conferred on the Congress
by the Constitution to sustain the right to control residential rents is, of
10Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641 (1944). The war powers are
found in § 8 of Article I of the Constitution and include the power:
"... to lay and collect taxes . . . to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States....
"To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning
captures on land or water;
"To raise and support armies; ...
"To provide and maintain a navy;
"To makes rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
"To provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions;
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers ......
IlVeazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869) ; The Gold Clause Cases,
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1934) ; Nortz v.
United States, 294 U. S. 317, 55 Sup. Ct. 428 (1934) ; Perry v. United States, 294 U. S.
330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432 (1934); The Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287
(1870); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (1884). The monetary
powers are found in § 8 of Article I of the Constitution and include the power:
• . . to lay and collect taxes . .. ;
"To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin;
"To borrow money on the credit of the United States... ;
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers ......
'
2Concerning the war powers, see Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 20 L. ed. 176 (1870);
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919) ; Ruppert
v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1920) ; United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Co., 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896) ; Concerning the monetary powers, see cases
cited under footnote 11, mtpra.
1945]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
course, obvious. The use of those powers to uphold continued control for
some period after the termination of the war is, at first, perhaps less clear,
but equally sound. For some period after the war, because of the shortages
of materials and labor caused thereby, there will remain an acute housing
shortage, with the danger of sharply rising rents and post war inflation and
collapse. It will be remembered that after World War I; and as a result of
conditions caused thereby, there came a great price and rent rise with the
collapse of the late 20's. Under the war powers, the Congress has the right
to legislate concerning evils which have resulted from the conflict, and, to
that end, continue its control of residential rents. As stated in Stewart v.
Kahn,13 "In the latter case the (war) power is not limited to victories in the
field and dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the
power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy
the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress. . . . It would be a
strange result if . . . Congress, which had the power to wage war and sup-
press the insurrection, had no power to remedy such an evil, which is one of
its consequences." 14 To the same effect are Hamilton v. Kentucky Distil-
leries Co.' 5 and Ruppert v. Caffey.16
The application of the monetary powers'conferred on the Congress by
the Constitution is found on the basis that from those powers the Congress
has the right to maintain a sound and stable currency. That is inherent in
the constitutional power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof."
Likewise it is the basis of the powers "to lay and collect taxes" and "to
borrow money 'on the credit of the United States." Obviously, a rent rise
will contribute to a general inflation and a correlative decrease in the value
of the dollar. That may mean a debasement of the national currency and
considerable difficulty in laying and collecting taxes and borrowing money.
Under the monetary powers, the Congress has the right to continue its con-
trol of residential rents to aid in preventing those results. As was said in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno,17 involving a tax on state bank notes, admittedly to
drive them from circulation, "Having thus in the exercise of undisputed
constitutional powers undertaken to provide a currency for the whole
country, it cannot be questioned, that Congress may, constitutionally, secure
the benefit of it to the people by appropriate legislation. To this end, Con-
111 Wall. 493, 20 L. ed. 176 (1870).
141d. at 507.
15251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919).
16251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1920).
178 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869). 1
[Vol. 31
FEDERAL RENT CONTROL
gress has denied the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, and has provided
by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin on the community.
To the same end, Congress may restrain, by suitable enactment, the circula-
tion as money of any notes not issued under its authority. Without this
power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the
country must be futile."' 8  And in The Gold Clazse Cases, particularly
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,'9 the Court upheld the power of
Congress to invalidate private contracts for the payment of gold or the value
of gold because the enforcement of such contracts would interfere with the
exertion of Congressional power to devalue the dollar in terms of gold, by
causing "dislocation of domestic economy." 20
GENERAL FAIRNESS AND EQUITY OF REGULATIONS
As has been seen, the Emergency Price Control Act, in Section 2 (b)
thereof, requires that regulations for the control of residential rents, issued
by the Administrator, be generally fair and equitable. That requirement has
raised several troublesome questions. Among them are what comparative
time periods are to be used and whether specific groups among landlords
are to be treated separately.
It now seems settled that by the requirement under discussion, current
returns to landlords must compare not unfavorably with returns for some
pre-war year which did not reflect changes in rents inconsistent with the
purposes of the Act, probably 1939.21 The period of original construction
or the time of purchase is rejected as probably abnormal, viz., a period of
inflation or of degression. If, on the other hand, without compulsion, for the
returns of 1939, landlords were willing to own and rent their properties,
then regulations which afford them similar returns cannot be generally unfair
or inequitable. At least such has been the reasoning of the courts.
In Spaeth v. Brown 22 the Emergency Court of Appeals pointed out, "Con-
gress clearly authorized the Administrator to stabilike rents at the level at
which they stood in the particular area in question on the most recent date
18d. at 549.
19294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1934).
201d. at 315.
21Spaeth v. Brown, 137 F. (2d) 669 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1943) ; Madison
Park Corporation v. Bowles, 140 F. (2d) 316 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1943) ; 315
West 97th Street Realty Co. v. Bowles (Emergency Court of Appeals No. 166, 1945)
opinion filed June 25, 1945, now pending on rehearing; Equitable Trust Co. v. Bowles,
143 F. (2d) 735 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1944); Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. v.
Bowles, 144 F. (2d) 361 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1944).
22137 F. (2d) 669 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1943).
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which did not reflect increases resulting from defense activities. It did not
intend that all rent control should be suspended until rentals reached the
higher levels of an earlier generation."2' In Madison Park Corporation v.
Bowles2 the same court concluded, from the legislative history of the Act,
that Congress intended "to permit business a yield or profit sufficient for its
sustenance in a state of efficiency and for reasonable development and ex-
pansion" and that this objective "usually will be obtained by permitting
profits which the industry was willing to accept prior to defense activities. ' '26
Currently, in 315 West 97th Street Realty Co. v. Bowles2 6 the Court ap-
proved the cases just cited and said, "The complainants' second contention is
that the regulation is not generally fair and equitable because it prevents
landlords from realizing the profits which they normally enjoyed before the
impact of defense activities. The Administrator concedes the appropriate-
ness of this test of the Validity of the regulation and indeed urges that it is
the only practicable way to measure the fairness of the return which land-
lords will realize on their investment. This Court has upon several occasions
given tacit approval to such a test.... The test of the historical return has
been applied by the Administrator in price control also. By the use of the so-
called industry earnings standard he has permitted price increases in order to
compensate for those cost increases which an industry could not absorb with-
out impairment of its normal peacetime earnings .... It may well be that in
earlier decades landlords did receive rates of return in excess of that enjoyed
in 1939 .... 1939 was the last full calendar year which could be described as a
peacetime year. It, therefore, appears to be the logical year to use for com-
parison. By 1940, the war in Europe had begun to show its effects in the
economy of the United States, so that it would not be accurate to describe it
as a normal peacetime year."
It further seems settled that the regulations, to be generally fair and
equitable, need not afford such returns to each individual landlord.27 On the
contrary, the Office of Price Administration contends that it is sufficient that,
in any defense rental area, average returns of all landlords subject to a
regulation, taken as a whole, be not unfavorable. As against that, in 315
West 97th Street Realty Co. v. Bowles, just discussed, the Emergency Court
of Appeals has held that the regulations must be fair and equitable to each
2 3Id. at 670.
24140 F. (2d) 316 (Emergency Court of Appeals, 1943).251d. at 324.
26Emergency Court of Appeals, No. 166, 1945, opinion filed June 25, 1945, now
pending on rehearing.
27Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641 (1944).
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typical, distinguishable segment of housing accommodations. It said, "Al-
though it is true, as a general rule, that a regulation must be judged by its
effect on the industry as a whole, there may be occasions when a typical
segment of the industry may call for distinctive treatment. . . . Upon, the
same principle, the validity of the regulation here in question (for housing
for the New York City Defense Rental Area) must be determined separately
with respect to its effect upon each of the three distinct groups (housing
renting under $30 per month, from $30 to $99.99 per month, and $100 or
over) into which the rental housing accommodations of the New York City
Defense Rental Area are found to fall." In view of the different sections and
accommodations within each area and the different factors affecting each,
there is considerable logic to the Court's position. However, such a result
will place a tremendous added burden on the administrator of the program.
REVIEW OF REGULATIONS AND ORDERS
This matter involves, among other things, some consideration of Procedural
Regulation No. 3, as amended,28 issued by the Administrator, establishing the
procedures of his office in making various determinations concerning rents.
It is well to understand that the administrative machinery in question consists
of O.P.A.'s national office in Washington, its' regional offices with jurisdic-
tion over the several states adjacent to the locations of such offices,2 9 a de-
fense rental area office within each area, a board of review consisting of
O.P.A. employees, and the Emergency Court of Appeals established for the
review of O.P.A. matters.30 This discussion conveniently lends itself to a
consideration of the review of general regulations, viz., that for housing and
that for hotels and rooming houses, and of the review of specific orders per-
taining to rents and evictions.31
Section 203a of the Emergency Price Control Act provides that at any
time after the issuance of any regulation, a landlord may file a protest setting
forth objections thereto and affidavits or other written ividence in support of
288 FED. REG. 526.
2 9For continental United States, the regional offices are in Boston, New York, Cleve-
land, Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco.3OThe Emergency Court of Appeals is created by § 204 (c) of the Emergency Price
Control Act. It consists of three judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United
States from among the judges of the various district courts and circuit courts of appeal.
The principal site of the court is at Washington. However, it holds sessions in the
principal cities throughout the country.
31Under the Act and the regulations, only landlords have a right to review. Tenants,
as with consumers under the Federal Trade Commission and workers under the various
labor laws, do not have such rights.
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such objections. Under Section 203(c), on request of the landlord, any
protest filed after September 1, 1944 may be considered by a Board of Re-
view, consisting of O.P.A. employees, which shall make recommendations to
the Administrator. Of course, the Administrator may grant or deny any
protest, in whole or in part. If the landlord is aggrieved by undue delay by
the Administrator in disposing of his protest, he may petition the Emergency
Court of Appeals for relief, which court shall enter some appropriate order.
If the Administrator does not act within a time fixed by the court, the
protest is deemed to be denied. Protests are filed with the Secretary of the
O.P.A. at its national office in Washington.
Section 204(a) provides that within thirty days after the denial of a
protest, the landlord may file a complaint with the Emergency Court of
Appeals praying that the regulation be set aside. Under Section 204(b),
such relief is to be granted only if the regulation is not in accordance with
law or is arbitrary or capricious. Review of the decisions of the Emergency
Court by the United States Supreme Court is provided as in other cases on
petitions for certiorari. Under the Act, the Emergency Court and the
Supreme Court, on review, have exclusive jurisdiction, to determine the
validity of any regulation, and every other court has been excluded from that
right.32
Under Procedural Regulation No. 3, as amended, matters concerning
specific adjustments in frozen rents-increases on petitions of landlords,
decreases on applications of tenants or on the initiative of the Administrator
-and proceedings involving particular equipment and *services or evictions
are considered in the defense rental area offices. Within ninety days after the
issuance of an adverse determination, the landlord may file with the defense
rental area office an application for review by the appropriate regional office.,
Within ninety days after an adverse determination by the regional office, the
landlord may file a protest against the particular order in question,, from
whence the procedures are similar to those for protests of general regulations,
just discussed. Generally, forms for proceedings before the area office; are
available there.
Returning to the Act, Section 204(c) provides that within thirty days
after arraignment in any criminal proceeding,, and within five days after
judgment in any civil or criminal case, for violation of the Act or any regu-
laton or order thereunder, the defendant (landlord) may apply for leave,
3 2These exclusive jurisdiction features have been held to be constitutional. See
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182, 63 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1943).
[Vol. 31
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and the court may grant leave, to file a complaint with the Emergency Court
of Appeals concerning the validity of the regulation or order alleged to have
been violated. In that event, stays of further proceedings in the civil or
criminal case are possible.
The Act and the regulations are complete with provisions permitting land-
lords to submit affidavits and written evidence in support of protests and
petitions, permitting oral hearings, if necessary, and requiring notices of
actions and evidence relied. on. In view of those requirements, the elements
of due process have been held to have been fulfilled.33
33Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 64 Sup. Ct. 660 (1944) ; Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641 (1944).
